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The IOC Made Me
Do it: Women’s Ski
Jumping, VANOC,
and the 2010 Winter
Olympics
Margot Young*
Introduction
Equality cases under the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms1 are discussed mostly for
the complexity of their equality dimensions and
the corresponding jurisprudential challenges
such nuances present litigator and judge alike.
The recent Charter equality challenge in Sagen
v. VANOC2 — the women’s ski jumping case —
presents a modification to this theme. It was a
tricky case for the challengers, but not because
of the discrimination issue. Rather, the novelty
of the state action problem in this case caused
the ski jumpers the most trouble, and, formally,
defeated their claim. Indeed, at both the British
Columbia Supreme Court and the British Columbia Court of Appeal this state action issue
befuddled the equality analysis itself. The result
is a case that has tremendous immediate popular power as an instance of sex discrimination
but that nonetheless has no purchase under the
Charter.
One might choose to discuss at length this
doctrinal twist. After all, both court decisions
add to the free-for-all that equality reasoning
under section 15 has become. Delphic utterances from the Supreme Court of Canada and
lower court creativity have combined to render
section 15 jurisprudence the ski cross of Charter
litigation. This comment will discuss some of
the problematic turns the two decisions took in
rejecting the claimants’ arguments about violation of the Charter’s equality provisions. However, the point of doing so is not to argue that
there is another, doctrinally truer, course the
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courts should have taken, one that guarantees
just, fair, and right results. Rather, the purpose
is to demonstrate that application questions under the Charter are condemned to jurisprudentially “uncomfortable” outcomes as a result of
an indeterminacy at the base of bills of rights
— such as the Charter — born of and nourished
by liberal legalism. As law professors Hutchinson and Petter argue, “inevitably the foundation collapses, like a false bottom, disclosing the
political chasms beneath.”3
The outcome in Sagen is, perhaps, not quite
the disaster that the quote implies. The women
ski jumpers, while clearly facing gender discrimination, are not the most indigent equality
claimants one can imagine. Even excluded from
jumping at the Olympics, they are not fording
the Styx. The case on its own immediate terms
is less distressing than those of other defeated
equality claimants — such as that of Louise Gosselin in Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney-General),4
where the ideological shaping that guided both
the Quebec legislative regime and the majority
judgment at the Supreme Court of Canada displayed deeply problematic (but popular) political assumptions about young welfare recipients
— assumptions that left untroubled severe economic deprivation. Nonetheless, sanctioned sex
discrimination in a publicly funded exercise on
the scale of the Olympics is no small issue. It
reinforces and perpetuates a troubling but traditional discriminatory message about women,
athletics, and social citizenship. (More about
this later.) But even more remarkable is what the
decisions say about the relevance of the Char-
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ter to government activities. A programme of
activity successfully located as governmental
under section 32 of the Charter can still evade
Charter scrutiny as long as the element at issue
in that programme simply follows directions issued by some private actor. It is another turn of
the screw: even governments can escape Charter responsibilities. It becomes less and less clear
just what progressive contribution the Charter
makes to struggles for a just and fair society. Or,
perhaps, it becomes more and more clear that
the Charter is not of any great direct or special
help to such endeavours.

The “Inrun”5 to the Case
The facts surrounding the ski jumping case
have become part of the larger political fabric
of the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver. Already contentious for its civil, economic, and
environmental impacts, the Winter Olympics
became notorious for the International Olympics Committee’s (IOC) refusal to include
women’s ski jumping as an event6 in the Olympic games programme, and for the Vancouver
Organizing Committee’s (VANOC) apparent
acquiescence in this decision. Ski jumping has
the dubious status of being the only sport in the
Winter Olympics that is not open to both men
and women.7 Men have jumped in the Olympics since 1924. Three men’s ski jumping events
were scheduled for the 2010 Games.8 No women
ski jumpers’ competitive events have ever been
scheduled at any Olympics.
A string of events led to the initiation of a
constitutional challenge before the British Columbia courts. Women ski jumpers have argued
for inclusion in the Winter Olympics for several past Olympics. In May 2006, the International Ski Federation, the governing body for
international skiing competitions, voted 114 -1
to approve a request to the IOC that women’s
ski jumping be added to the 2010 Games programme. The following November, VANOC,
after receiving a request to do so from members
of the Canadian Women’s Ski Jumping Team,
sent a letter in support of inclusion to the IOC.
Days later, however, the IOC Executive Board
decided not to include women’s ski jumping
in the Games. The IOC claimed the ruling was
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based on “technical merit” and had nothing to
do with gender discrimination.9 President of the
IOC Jacques Rogge elaborated: “We do not want
the medals to be diluted and watered down.”10
At this point, by all appearances, VANOC quietly accepted the IOC ruling and the exclusion.
The women ski jumpers did not. Four mothers of female ski jumpers filed a discrimination
complaint with the Canadian Human Rights
Commission.11 The complaint resulted in a mediated settlement which, it has been reported,
required the federal government to press the
IOC to include women’s ski jumping in the 2010
Olympics.12 Efforts by Helena Guergis, federal
Secretary of State for Sport, were unsuccessful.
Faced with this outcome, on May 21, 2008 a
group of nine elite women ski jumpers — from
five countries including Canada — filed a Charter challenge to their exclusion from the Olympic Games.13
A year and a half later, the case has failed:
a rejection of the challenge by the British Columbia Supreme Court14 was confirmed by the
Court of Appeal15 and leave for a further appeal
was denied by the Supreme Court of Canada.16

The Jump: Argument at Each Level
of Court
The case raised two key doctrinal issues:
does the Charter apply to VANOC and, if so, has
VANOC unjustifiably infringed the Charter’s
equality rights by staging men’s ski jumping but
not women’s ski jumping at the 2010 Olympics?
And there was one critical fact: the IOC alone
has control over the selection of events staged
at the Games. The results at both levels of court
in British Columbia revolved around this fact,
although its doctrinal significance varied.

Application of the Charter
Jurisprudence on the application of the
Charter is complex. It relies on a fundamental, but ultimately porous and indeterminate,
distinction between government and non-government. The result is that Supreme Court of
Canada case law is a labyrinth of qualifications
and alternative lines of argument. Even the first
decision on Charter application, RWDSU v. Dol-
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phin Delivery Ltd.,17 is contradictory—holding
that the Charter both does and does not apply to
the common law.18 Comment on this inconsistency is not novel19 but it reminds us that, from
the start, Charter application jurisprudence has
been plagued by judicial insistence on a false
positivism with consequent contradiction and
confoundment.
The reason for this is simple. The Charter,
like any other liberal rights protecting document, has a central (but impossible) necessity:
it must articulate a coherent boundary between
the public and the private, between government and non-government. And it must use
this boundary to determine whether the Charter applies. Protecting the individual from the
powerful state is one thing. Indeed it is the
ambition that animates liberalism: in classical
liberal thought, the concentrated power of the
state imperils the “heroic individual.” For many
liberals, this core “anxiety” is addressed by the
imposition of formal, legally imposed rights to
maintain the ideologically mandated boundary
between state power and individual liberty.20
But requiring non-state actors to adhere to constitutional virtues is something else. This use of
rights smacks of the very state coercion of individuals that liberalism fears: an attack on the
moral autonomy of the individual.21 It tips rights
protections on their liberal heads, changing
them from markers of liberty to instruments of
state control.22 The application of rights to nonstate actors is thus contradictory within classical liberalism’s prism. Liberal rights documents
must preserve a sphere of untouchable private
action clear of obligatory constitutional norms
and “state” virtues.23 And, this separation of the
public sphere from the realm of private activity sets limits on the types of rights claims the
courts recognize.24
Section 32 of the Charter governs the reach
of the Charter25 and has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court to instantiate such a public/private distinction. This is done by way of the doctrine of vertical application and that doctrine’s
reliance on the distinction between government
and non-government. Thus the Charter, we are
told, applies only to government actors and actions. This requires in any Charter application
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case some analytical inquiry into whether or
not the state, as the Supreme Court of Canada’s
interpretation of section 32 understands it, is
involved.26
Of course, it is impossible to draw a clear
and predictable line between what is an exercise of state power and what is not. The state is
so fully imbricated in all aspects of social and
economic life, in both the retention of current
distributions of resources and changes to that
distribution, that convincing arguments can
almost always be made that something both is
and is not a product, somehow, of state action.
Reliance on such a distinction ignores how the
“public” and the “private” influence and reinforce each other. While the distinction is an interesting and sometimes useful abstraction, attempts to use it to draw a line in the real world
are “at best futile and at worst covertly ideological.”27 That is, while the line between the public
and private is indeterminate, the articulation
of it, in this instance by courts, is not apolitical
but rather follows often clear ideological lines.28
(Indeed, the line-drawing involved is always
political — sometimes just more starkly so depending on where the observer stands.) Still, the
larger point is that Charter application jurisprudence is committed to a distinction that is analytically central but practically indeterminate.
When judges, then, are asked to decide if an entity or an action lies inside or outside the realm
of Charter scrutiny, they are “engaged in political and partisan decision-making.”29 Liberal
democratic theorists generally need not deny
this — but certainly some (liberal) defenders of
judicial review do.30
The result is case law that skates on thin ice
— using fancy judicial footwork, and the occasional leap, to distinguish past jurisprudence
when new and compelling factual scenarios
emerge. In this manner, at least two lines of
argument for holding an entity or an activity
accountable as government under the Charter
have emerged from the Supreme Court. First,
the Charter will apply if the entity in question
is itself “government” for the purposes of section 32. This entails an examination of the nature and degree of governmental control and requires a finding of routine, daily governmental
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oversight of the entity.31 The test is one of form,
rather than function: are the markers of government control present? If the entity in question or the action under issue is subject to the
requisite degree of government control, then it
will be deemed governmental for the purposes
of Charter application. The second line of argument holds that, even if the entity itself is not
“governmental” in this first sense, the Charter
will be held applicable to an otherwise private
entity to the extent that the entity is carrying
out a government policy or programme. This
second test’s ancestry lies in Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General),32 a judgment
where the Supreme Court of Canada, faced with
sympathetic rights claimants, had to find a way
around its previous holding that hospitals were
private (not governmental) entities and thus
immune from Charter oversight.33 The Court’s
solution in that case was to generate a second
line of argument for Charter applicability —
one that looked to the activity not the entity.34
The ski jumpers, at least at the trial court,
argued that VANOC was subject to the Charter
along both lines of argument. VANOC’s argument here, and at every stage of argument at
both levels of court, was simply that the IOC
alone had the power to set Olympic events.
The issues of Charter application were canvassed at most length in the trial judgment of
the British Columbia Supreme Court. Madam
Justice Fenlon rejected the plaintiffs’ contention
that VANOC was subject to “routine or regular”
control by government.35 This was despite the
following facts:
1. the governments collectively36 appoint a
majority of the members of the Board of
Directors, at pleasure (not fixed terms),
and can also name special appointees to
the Board;
2. the governments have a series of rights
to financial and business information
and approvals;
3. the governments make significant direct and indirect financial contributions to the Games’ budget;
4. VANOC is prohibited from amending
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its bylaws or essential governing structure without consent of all governments;
5. VANOC’s original by-laws and letters
patent are subject to approval of three
of the governments;
6. VANOC is fiscally accountable to
government.
Instead, the court stated that VANOC was subject to the “routine and regular” or “day-to-day”
control of the IOC, a private, Swiss non-governmental entity.37
Madam Justice Fenlon continued nonetheless, stating that “hosting the 2010 Games is
uniquely governmental in nature.”38 The Olympic Games are awarded not to a private entity
but to the host governments: only a government
can bid for and host Olympic Games.39 The IOC,
while it owns the Games, does not actually stage
them. The result, Justice Fenlon concluded, was
that “VANOC is subject to the Charter when it
carries out the activity of planning, organizing,
financing, and staging the 2010 Olympics.”40
Thus, the Charter is applicable as an extension
of the second line of argument, initially elaborated in Eldridge.41
However, despite her earlier conclusion that
the Charter applied to VANOC as it delivered
the Olympics, Justice Fenlon found that section
15 could not apply to the exclusion of women
ski jumpers from the Olympics. A breach of
section 15 cannot be found for decisions that
VANOC cannot control: “only those activities
and the decisions that VANOC has the ability
to make while delivering those activities can be
the source of a breach of the Charter.”42 VANOC
did not, the court asserted, exercise any of its
decision-making power in delivering the 2010
Games in breach of section 15. In short, the application issue reemerges, this time as spoiler of
the section 15 claim.
Like a piece of Swiss cheese, the activity of
delivering the Olympics has holes in it. VANOC,
staging a government programme with a discriminatory element, gets to say it is merely acting on the orders of the IOC and is therefore
immune to section 15 obligations. The government activity named in the application discusVolume 18, Number 3, 2010

sion turns out not to include the selection of
competitive events — only the staging of those
events.43 The result allows government to carry
out or assign a programme with any number of
explicitly discriminatory events, provided that
the control over the decision to discriminate is
contractually left with some entity other than
the government or the stager of the event. This
effectively folds the “ascribed government activity” test back into the government control
test, albeit at the section 15 stage, and the slice
of government activity is now more holes than
cheese.
Reasoning at the Court of Appeal followed
this result but by a different route. The Court of
Appeal began its section 32 analysis from the
position that VANOC is a private entity controlled by another private entity, the IOC: “no
government has legal power to control VANOC
even if government wished to do so.”44 The
court goes on to say that even if the hosting
of the Games could be construed as a matter
within the authority of the government under
section 32 of the Charter (and thus a governmental programme), the selection of the events
at the Games could not. This is because the IOC
has the exclusive authority to set those events.
Moreover, the government contracted for the
Olympics before the events had been set, indicating that “it is clear that the specific events
to be staged were not important to the goals of
government.”45 This is unpersuasive. Governments may have been agnostic as to what events
are scheduled generally. But surely they should
be assumed to have as at least an implicit goal
that constitutional standards are observed in
any programme in which they participate.
At the Court of Appeal, the Charter application focus is narrowed to the decision to exclude
the women. The broader context is irrelevant
and the question of whether the staging of the
Games is otherwise subject to the Charter is left
open. Thus the claim fails at the Charter application stage: there is no government actor nor
government activity involved in the exclusion of
the women ski jumpers. The import is the same
as at the lower court: leave decision-making
responsibility for some element of a (possible)
government programme with some other pri-
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vate player and that decision — no matter how
odious — is Charter immune.
The British Columbia Supreme Court and
Court of Appeal both ignored that the IOC’s
decision to exclude the women is implemented
and realized by VANOC’s staging of the Games.
VANOC must take a myriad of small and large
actions to ensure that the men can compete:
construction of the ski jumps, transportation
to Vancouver and to the competitions, provision of housing in Vancouver, provision of athletes’ seats at the Opening Ceremonies, conducting medal ceremonies with medals, and so
on.46 VANOC excluded the women from each
of these activities and the men’s exclusive participation is made possible only by these activities. Pointedly, in practice, there is no clear
and sharp line between the IOC’s decision and
VANOC’s implementation of it.47
Contractual obligations ought not to negate
VANOC’s duty to refuse to implement a discriminatory decision if the law, here the Constitution, requires such a refusal. To say that
VANOC had no control over the question, and
therefore no constitutional obligation, is to reverse the proper order of analysis and to allow
contract to trump constitution. It was a variant
of this concern that led the Supreme Court of
Canada to elaborate an alternative course to
Charter applicability in the Eldridge decision:
“Just as governments are not permitted to escape Charter scrutiny by entering into commercial contracts or other ‘private’ arrangements, they should not be allowed to evade their
constitutional responsibilities by delegating the
implementation of their policies and programs
to private entities.”48 Otherwise, governments
can simply privatize their way out of Charter
compliance.
The Court of Appeal, despite its section 32
conclusion, also considered the section 15 aspect
of the case, if merely to recycle its initial arguments about control. Here the court narrowed
the guarantee of equality proffered by section
15 to a guarantee that applies only to “the way
that the law affects individuals.”49 Relying on
the Supreme Court of Canada judgment in Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia
(Attorney General)50, the court argued that the
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ski jumpers must show that the unequal benefit (the availability of men’s but not women’s
ski jumping events) is “in some way a product
of ‘law’.”51 This, the Court stated, is a threshold
requirement for section 15 breaches.52 And because the decision to exclude the women does
not stem from statutory authority (or from any
other power flowing from the Crown) there was
no “law” involved to trigger section 15 analysis.53 Moreover, even if the Multiparty Agreement or the Host City Contract (the two contracts “assigning” the Olympics to Vancouver)
qualified as law,54 the policy that is the subject of
the ski jumpers’ complaint lay within the exclusive authority of the IOC, not those contractual
documents.55 The issue under section 15, for
the Court of Appeal like the trial court, then,
was control — more specifically, VANOC’s
lack of control over the choice of events at the
Olympics.

constructs and enforces historical myths about
women’s physical inferiority.58 Ski jumping offers a particularly compelling illustration, as it
is a sport from which women have until quite
recently been excluded, yet it is also a sport in
which women’s abilities are roughly comparable to men’s.59 Thus, tensions around women’s
exclusion and the threats their inclusion represents to the gendered texture of the sport are
easier to read.60 Certainly, despite women’s performance as jumpers, gender stereotypes about
women and the sport persist. Only a few years
ago, Gian Franco Kasper, at the time head of the
International Ski Federation, opined to the media about ski jumping for women: “Don’t forget,
it’s like jumping down from, let’s say, about two
meters on the ground about a thousand times
a year, which seems not to be appropriate for
ladies from a medical point of view.”61 Apparently, exploding uteri threaten.62

This is an unconvincing argument. It makes
little sense to restrict section 15 to a narrower
ambit than other Charter rights and to exclude
actions otherwise caught by section 32.56 The
argument immunizes significant ranges of the
modern administrative state’s allocation of resources and powers. And this argument also
effectively allows government to contract out
of equality rights responsibility for elements of
programmes for which it is otherwise accountable under the Charter. Too thin a parsing of
government action that is accountable under
section 15 adds yet another mogul to the run
for equality litigants.

Discrimination Against the Women
Ski Jumpers

Consequently, the equality issue in this case
is, as equality issues go, an easy one. It is simple,
formal equality that is at stake. The much-maligned “similarly situated” test does just fine as
a vehicle for showing up the discrimination at
issue here. As a number of commentators have
already noted, rights claims that require significant redistribution or state expenditures tax
our courts.63 Claims where the female equality litigants are much the same as comparable
men “but for” their gender are the most section 15 friendly.64 In the Sagen case, the jumps
were already built. No subtle understandings of
gendered nuance or complications of the social
manifestations of sex difference are needed. The
women jump as well, sometimes better, than the
men and the evidence is clear that it is only their
gender that holds them back.

While the issue of discrimination was not
the legal fulcrum on which these judgments
turned, it was, after all, the whole point of the
case. Some observations consequently are warranted. This case is just one moment in the history of women in ski jumping but it encapsulates the larger and long-standing gender issues
of the sport. Commentators have noted that the
sport of ski jumping, in particular, “offers an illuminating discourse in gender stereotypes and
expectations.”57 Organized sport in general both

This case is also not unique, nor is the discrimination newly noted. Sex discrimination
challenges to sporting facilities and organizations abound. One of the first section 15 gender
discrimination cases involved a successful challenge by a twelve year old girl, Justine Blainey, who wished to play in a boys-only hockey
league.65 Since Blainey, every year or two it
seems, a sex discrimination challenge based on
exclusion from full benefits of some organized
sport surfaces, although typically these cases
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are brought under statutory human rights law
and not the Charter.66 While the ski jumpers
were considering their legal action at least two
other sport sex discrimination complaints were
in the news.67
Madam Justice Fenlon’s conclusion on the
question of different treatment was stark: “the
exclusion of women’s ski jumping from the 2010
Games is discriminatory…. [T]he plaintiffs will
be denied this opportunity for no reason other
than their sex.”68 Her reasoning was straightforward. Neither the male nor the female ski
jumpers met the requisite degree of “universality” required by the IOC’s formal criteria
for event inclusion. 69 Both fail by roughly the
same amount (taking into account the differential rates the criteria set for men and women),
yet the men got to jump by virtue of their historic involvement in the “Olympic tradition.”70
And the “Olympic tradition” by which the men
benefit incorporates and is shaped by historic
stereotyping and prejudice against women athletes — women ski jumpers in particular. The
“grandfathering” of the men into the Olympics
“perpetuates the effect of that prejudice and is,
therefore, discriminatory.”71 The only problem
for the ski jumpers’ case was that the discrimination was done by the IOC, not VANOC.
The IOC escaped lightly. The British Columbia Supreme Court took at face value the
IOC’s many expressions of good will towards
gender equity. The court gave only slight weight
to expert findings of extensive discrimination against women in the ski jumping movement and in sport generally, and the impact
of this discrimination on the IOC’s decision.72
The women had argued that historic prejudice
against women in ski jumping meant that, even
though the IOC’s criteria determining the required degree of universality for a sport to be
included in the Olympics set a lower threshold
for women than for men, the criteria for women were discriminatory.73 Historic prejudice
had acted as “societal headwinds” preventing
women from reaching technical merit requirements.74 The ski jumpers gave evidence about
lower levels of funding, support, and training
opportunities than their male counterparts,
making the achievement of a world-class level
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very difficult, if not impossible.75 Inclusion in
the Olympics was cited as a key and necessary
mechanism for the growth and expansion of the
sport.76 The court rejected these broader arguments, arguing that discrimination flowed only
from the application of the “Olympic tradition
exemption” to the men’s ski jumping.77
Outside of the courts, more realistic and
less naive understandings hold sway. Observing
that other events newly scheduled for the 2010
Games — notably women’s ski cross78 — also
fall significantly below the universality threshold for inclusion that the IOC claims it applies,
some argue that: “What matters to the IOC is:
Will the event sell tickets, will it sell TV time,
is it popular?”79 Partner this observation with
the following comment by Dick Pound, a longtime Canadian IOC official, about future IOC
treatment of the ski jumpers, and the IOC’s insistence that the decision was based “purely on
technical merit”80 becomes increasingly suspect:
But if in the meantime, you’re making all kinds
of allegations about the IOC and how it’s discriminating on the basis of gender and so on
then the IOC, in a very human reaction, might
say, “Oh yeah, I remember them. They’re the
ones that embarrassed us and caused us a lot of
trouble in Vancouver. Maybe they should wait
another four years or eight years or whatever
it may be.”81

Only 17 per cent of the IOC members are women and only one woman sits on the IOC executive.82 The evidence suggests that the commercial imperatives of a private corporation that
owns the rights to a very expensive sporting
event — as well as personal grudges or biases
— can significantly and unfairly influence selection of new competitive Olympic events.

The “Outrun:”83 Reflections on the
Challenge
The decisions by the two courts were not
particularly popular. Editorials in the local papers supported the women84 and a recent poll
showed that 73 per cent of Canadians were in
favour of including women ski jumpers in the
Olympics.85 A comment by Lindsay Van, one
of the defeated ski jumpers, sums up one par-
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ticular sentiment: “The Canadian court system is a little bit weak if it can’t stand up to the
IOC and apply Canadian law.”86 Even the trial
judge found “something distasteful”87 about the
outcome.
Certainly, one could argue for an improved
theory of Charter applicability. Both academics and judges have articulated more functional
tests for designating an entity or activity as governmental that better fit the landscape of contemporary Canadian society.88 But such doctrinal finessing is not the main mission of this
comment. Rather, the purpose is to show how
even a fairly simple claim of sex discrimination can founder when forced to seek resolution
through Charter litigation.
Law can variously moderate, confirm, or
challenge power.89 Charter law, in particular, has
been touted as establishing a set of guarantees
that moves us towards a better and fairer society. But as we have seen in Sagen, the distinctions at play in Charter argument can instead
“provide formal paraphernalia behind which
private power thrives relatively unchecked and
substantive issues are arbitrarily and unjustly
resolved.”90 More specifically, the private power
of both the IOC and VANOC as the two corporations roll out a large public event — at considerable public inconvenience and expense, with
broad government involvement — is rendered
unproblematic. VANOC’s complicity in IOC
treatment of the women is excused, even legitimated. The exclusion of the women ski jumpers, even though condemned by the lower court
judge, is left intact. Governments, the IOC, and
VANOC, after expressions of concern for the
“girls,” quickly move on.91 The Charter case,
it seems, simply reinforces the power of the
Olympics corporations to treat women however
they see fit.
To return to the earlier point that the drawing of any line between the public and the private is inevitably political, what was at stake in
this case? How can we understand the courts’
refusal to draw the line so that VANOC and the
exclusion of the women ski jumpers lie within
the reach of the Charter and its equality rights?
Certainly, VANOC occupies a hazy middle
ground between formal government and its
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legislative acts, and other entities now clearly
doctrinally accepted as private. Would holding
VANOC subject to the Charter threaten the collapse of these older distinctions? Perhaps. Anytime a new and challenging factual scenario
forces a recalibration of the line, there is the risk
that the indeterminancy of the whole public/
private edifice will be clearly revealed. If this
corporation (VANOC) or this programme (the
Olympics) is considered governmental, then
who knows what corporation is within range of
the Charter’s strictures?
But maybe it is also important that this
case is about sport, and about women in sport.
Imagine if the exclusion had been of some other
group, say black or Jewish participants, and if
the event had been some other form of international meeting hosted by our governments.
Would the courts have been as hands-off in
such a case? Would the governments and local
organizers been as quick to defer to an extranational decision maker?
Much has been written about sport as transmitter of social and cultural values, its replication of hierarchical, racist, militaristic, and patriarchal social structures, and its centrality to
Western society.92 A history of exclusion and
discrimination (of many sorts) marks national
and international sports organizations. “The
history of modern sport is a history of cultural
struggle.”93 But it often takes clever and persistent social archaeology to reveal how this history persists and shapes what we consider normal
and natural about sport, and how sport plays
such a powerful and structural role in our societies. Perhaps the ski jumpers’ application of
the Charter to the Olympics ran afoul of deeply
entrenched ideas about sport — of dominant
assumptions about sport as essentially private
and individual, not a public institution. That
Canadian human rights law had a tradition
(now defunct) of allowing sex discrimination
in sports speaks to long-standing assumptions
about, among other things, the preferability of
private ordering in sports and its organization.94
It may also be that sport just seems too trivial to
engage the full force of constitutional law; it is
okay, that is, to leave it to its own devices, even if
a few women suffer some missed competitions.
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So, at the end of the day, what can one say
about this case? Certainly, it is a shame that the
women are shut out. Their exclusion has implications for the development of their sport, as
funding — both governmental and sponsorship
— so often is dependant upon Olympic eligibility. But there are other observations more specific to the sport of Charter litigation as it plays
out in the Canadian polity. Charter litigation
has contingent and unpredictable significance.
In addition to its containment of the struggles
of subordinate groups and its legitimation of
that subordination, it can on occasion catalyze
broader political support for those struggles. It
is also possible that, despite what Dick Pound
says, the public black eye the case gave the IOC
will make a positive difference to the fate of the
women ski jumpers at the 2014 Olympics. Already, movement on the issue is discernable.
The Governor General of Canada, Michaëlle
Jean, reports lobbying IOC President Jacques
Rogge at the opening ceremony of the 2010
Olympics for inclusion of women’s ski jumping
at the next Winter Olympics. Rogge is reported
by her to have commented favourably on the
women’s chances.95 (Although in the wake of
the 2010 Olympics and the domination of women’s hockey by the Canadian and American
teams, Rogge waded into gendered controversy
again by hinting that women’s hockey may soon
be on the chopping block.96 ) The story continues, with a new flight of ski jumpers to carry
the cause and another chapter in women’s ski
jumping to be written. But the Charter has once
again proven resilient to attempts to use it to
obtain gender justice. The orchestration of the
2010 Olympics was the wrong playing field for
Charter claims, and women ski jumpers continue to be consigned to the bleachers and kept
from the podium.
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